Lindsell Train Global Equity Fund C Class (USD)

31st January 2026
Monthly Report

Fund Profile

The portfolio is concentrated, with the number of stocks ranging from 20-35, and has low turnover.

Fund Objective

To increase the value of Shareholders' capital over the longer term from a focused portfolio of global equities, primarily those listed or traded on recognised exchanges in developed countries world-wide.

Price Data

C Class ($)

Minimum Investment	$250,000

Fees

Management Fee	0.60%
TER	0.68%

*The TER is a measure of the Fund's total operating expenses over 12 months, including management fee, as a percentage of the Fund's net assets.The TER quoted is indicative, based on expenses and average assets for the year ending December 2024. It is calculated by the Fund Administrator. It is an indication of the likely level of costs and will fluctuate as the Fund's expenses and average net assets change. The TER excludes any portfolio transaction costs.

Investment Growth Since Inception



Source: Morningstar Direct. As at 31st January 2026. Perfomance figures are calculated NAV-NAV, net of fees, in USD. The graph shows the growth of $100 invested in the fund vs MSCI World since inception.The illustrative investment performance which is shown is for illustrative purposes only and is calculated by taking the actual initial fees and all ongoing fees into account for the amount shown. Income is reinvested on the reinvestment date. **Past performance is not a guide to future performance.**

Fund Facts

Portfolio Managers	Michael Lindsell, Nick Train, James Bullock
Fund Size	$3,829m
Share Class Inception Date	30th June 2014
ISIN	IE00BK4Z4V95
SEDOL	BK4Z4V9
Fund Type	Irish OEIC (UCITS)
Benchmark	MSCI World Index
Fund Sector	Global Equity
Style	Long-term, bottom-up focus
No. of Holdings	25
Valuation Point & Dealing deadline	12 noon each Ireland & UK Business Day
Unit Type	Accumulation
Auditor	Grant Thornton
Regulator	Central Bank of Ireland
Fund Depository	The Bank of New York Mellon SA/NV

Performance Summary (%)

	Cumulative			Annualised				
Net Return	**1 m**	**3m**	**YTD**	**1 yr**	**3 yrs**	**5 Yrs**	**10 Yrs**	**Since Launch**
C Class ($)	-3.45	-3.68	-3.45	0.08	7.23	2.12	9.40	8.74
MSCI World Index ($)	2.24	3.36	2.24	19.58	19.31	12.87	13.11	10.43

Calendar Year Performance (%)

Net Return	**2025**	**2024**	**2023**	**2022**	**2021**
C Class ($)	6.5	11.7	12.5	-14.6	-0.7
MSCI World Index ($)	21.1	18.7	23.8	-18.1	21.8

Statistics (%)

Since Inception		**DATE**
Highest annualised return	+44.1	31.01.2018
Lowest annualised return	-24.6	30.06.2022

12 month rolling performance figures

Source: Morningstar Direct. As at 31st January 2026. The figures for this share class and the index are based on total return (i.e. capital and income) in USD. All charges are accounted for except any transaction costs. Actual annual figures are available on request.
The value of participatory interests (units) may go down as well as up and past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance.

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Top Ten Equity Holidings (%)

Alphabet	9.95%
TKO	7.87%
London Stock Exchange Group	7.42%
Nintendo	7.16%
RELX	7.10%
Walt Disney	4.95%
Thermo Fisher	4.73%
Universal Music Group	4.67%
FICO	4.47%
Diageo	4.04%
Total	**62.36%**

Sector Allocation (%)

Communication Services	36.4%
Consumer Staples	22.4%
Financials	11.1%
Consumer Discretionary	9.5%
Information Technology	8.3%
Industrials	7.1%
Health Care	4.7%
Cash	0.4%
Total	**100.0%**

Country Allocation (%)

USA	50.6%
UK	25.3%
Europe ex-UK	13.6%
Japan	10.1%
Cash	0.4%
Total	**100.0%**

Investment Team Commentary

In December 2020, Upstart, a self-styled 'FICO killer' listed on Nasdaq. By harnessing new technology, specifically AI, the company promised a cleverer and above all cheaper alternative to FICO's credit scores. The tech was effectively a black box that no one quite understood; and never mind that FICO was posting 17% revenue growth, the promise was tangible. Why shouldn't this apparently limitless new technology unseat the sleepy incumbent. By late 2021, Upstart's share price had risen almost 20-fold, with FICO's falling by over 20%. But, whilst the disruption was painfully easy to visualise, the reality was more nuanced. FICO was never really a tech business, but an IP owner. The scores were and still are deeply integrated throughout a niche but important industry, carrying with them the heavy burden of regulatory compliance, customer recognition, and system integration. This, it turned out, was not so easy to replace. Nor was its de facto status as the 'tried and tested' industry benchmark. Upstart had not seen a whole credit cycle play out and indeed when rates rose, losses started to mount. Today, Upstart trades at a tenth of its peak share price, whilst FICO (maintaining double-digit revenue growth throughout) has more than trebled.

Around 2013 Intuit faced a similar 'existential' threat as New Zealand-based Xero launched an aggressive assault on the US small business accounting software market. Again, deploying new technology (in this case cloud computing) as a smarter, and cheaper alternative. However, whilst Xero remains a credible business in several markets, Intuit's core US franchise proved far stickier than generally envisioned. Ripping out a plumbed in, critical accounting function is the last thing business owners want to do, giving Intuit plenty of time to accelerate its own adoption of cloud computing. Far from killing Intuit off, cloud and other initiatives have accelerated the company's organic growth from c.6-7% in the mid-2010s up to double digits today, whilst the shares have risen seven-fold.

The reason these threats are taken so seriously, often with little hard supporting evidence, is that they follow straight from Clayton Christensen's rightly respected Innovators Dilemma playbook. The idea that a new iteration of technology can leapfrog existing players by offering a disruptively cheap, 'good enough' alternative. This gains adoption at the lower end before moving upmarket and disrupting the incumbent, weighted down by legacy tech and too worried about existing cashflows to truly innovate. It's a powerful narrative and has disrupted many technology-driven industries over time from mainframe computing to digital cameras, or indeed CRM software.

However, the advantage isn't always with the unburdened new entrant. The staggering failure rate of startups alone should tell you as much. There is also a classification error being made. Technology is a treadmill. It quickly commoditises, placing the burden of innovation heavily upon the existing players. But neither FICO, nor Intuit are really technology companies, and neither boasts exclusive technical expertise. Instead, they offer trust, functionality, and reliability, reducing complexity and creating value for their customers far in excess of their product's costs. Ironically, incumbency is a key part of this value. No one gets fired for choosing IBM, and 'good enough' isn't really good enough if a hallucinating Large Language Model (LLM) misprices your loans, logs errors in the general ledger, or wrongly files with the regulator. Unlike photography or sales management, these are industries with high costs of error, with existing solutions that are regulatory compliant, auditable, secure, and known to work.

But the AI threat is back. Cheap AI tools can now scrape data and automate workflows, meaning this same group of businesses are again targeted for disintermediation, if not extinction. Again, the narrative's appeal is in part its tangibility, with outcomes that feel viscerally binary. Extinction is not a pretty thing to visualise, and investors have reacted accordingly. The fact that nearly everyone has tried ChatGPT further consumerises our windows into what are actually pretty arcane industrial niches.

And I'm sorry to say January's performance was consequentially bleak. Your Fund came in 5.69% behind its benchmark after an already challenging 2025, with FICO falling 13% in USD and Intuit down 25%. Software companies around the world sold off as industry giants SAP and Microsoft (neither held in the Fund) published quarterly results. To make matters worse, the beginning of February saw the violent, and indiscriminate dumping of data and digital platform businesses, with core fund holdings, RELX and London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) falling by double digit percentages in a day – all triggered by a product announcement (11 industry specific plugins for Claude Cowork) from AI leader Anthropic. Unlike the above examples, the promise and pace of AI is now so universally acknowledged that the impact was not company specific, but thematic. Almost the entire information services universe fell on the idea that these tools might commoditise data provision, with some referencing the 'DeepSeek shock' that hit big tech in 2025. Many have written about the fragility of world markets: their concentration around a small number of stocks and the historically high weighting of passive flows, with thematic or factor-based strategies taking up much of the remaining 'active' slack. Perhaps this all serves to exacerbate market reactions

So, to use those dangerous four words, *is this time different?* And how should investors respond?

With all humility we believe we have been here before – or at least heard echoes of it. With FICO as we built a position in 2022, with RELX as we held it through the mid-2010s (when its science business was supposedly threatened by open access and online self-publishing), and as recently as last year with Alphabet, which spent six months in the 'AI losers' bucket before rocketing back to 'AI winner'. We saw – and missed – it with Microsoft in the early 2010s after Google Docs launched, and when Salesforce supposedly threatened SAP's ERP. Whilst deeply painful to experience in real time, this again feels like a similar opportunity, from which we earnestly hope patient investors will, in the longer run, benefit.

And so, my personal response is to be bullish. That the market is there to serve not to guide, is a core tenet of long-term active investment. Benjamin Graham gave us Mr. Market to personify this idea – that the list of stock quotations is exactly that – a list of prices from which you can purchase, or not, depending on your view of a company's intrinsic value. Graham also gave us that in the long term, the market is a weighing machine, and that eventually prices will converge with this intrinsic value. For businesses blessed with long track records, this contention is demonstrably the case. A company compounding its cashflow at say 13% p.a. over 25 years, will end up generating 20x as much cash, producing handsome returns for investors, even if the multiple on those cashflows fluctuates over time. This is largely what has happened with LSEG. In the 25 years since listing in 2001 free cash flows have compounded at 17% p.a. (boosted by the Refinitiv transaction), and whilst the FCF yield has risen, the shares are indeed up 20-fold.

Continued....

Investment Team Commentary

This doesn't mean we know where valuation multiples will head next – this on any given day is a subjective judgement – and for that reason we have always been conservative with our valuation work. But the intrinsic value of future cashflows is objective, and at current prices, even at our most conservative, we're excited.

And the reality is, recent underlying results for every portfolio company mentioned above have been impressive. We can point to no operational failings to account for the recent share price falls. The last reported FY organic revenue growth for FICO was 16%, Intuit 16%, RELX 7%, and LSEG 6%, and in each case, this represents a meaningful acceleration versus say five years prior. Likewise, each company has major buyback programs underway, which in most cases are also accelerating, implying that boards and management too are similarly confident in their outlook.

There is in fact little new information in the Anthropic release, nor does it really bring much novelty to the market. In short it provides domain specific applications for what were previously general user interface tools, targeting particular verticals such as legal and finance bringing them into direct sight of companies such as RELX and LSEG. Yet, RELX (unhelpfully currently in a closed period, so unable to rebut) already offers similar workflow tools within its own LexisNexis Protégé. 'No code' tools (often billed as a way to 'vibe code' programs or interfaces without needing to type code itself) sound great, but again, no code builders already exist within RELX's Lexis+ environment; and anyway code is a very small part (most estimate less than 10%) of software's cost base or value proposition, having already largely commoditised (first via offshoring, more lately with inhouse AI tools).

More importantly, RELX and LSEG both possess clear data moats. RELX for example has spent decades amassing over 100 billion legal documents, from over 50,000 sources (some of them in hard copy only), with another 2 million added every day – the vast majority of which contain proprietary content. Exactly how much is truly proprietary is open to spirited debate, but RELX itself claims 30% more case law than any competitor, and with clear physical and regulatory barriers around the distribution of legal content, a significant proportion remains entirely unavailable to LLMs. Claude's tools have no grounding in primary law, and the company's press release specifically designates law as a 'high-risk' function for its users. There is no use going to court with only some of the relevant case history. Lawyers have had their licences suspended for trying. Law is another industry with a high cost of failure. Legal data is rarely more than 1-2% of a law firm's cost base, yet critical to their function, and does not seem an obvious target for cost savings.

A possible follow-on fear is that even if not an existential threat, AI may constrain future growth, for example if the analytical tools currently being sold atop the data commoditise. Whilst AI is a fast-moving field, and hence difficult to predict, we instead see the LLMs themselves converging. The Anthropic announcement comes on the back of a similar one from OpenAI which announced the Prism workspace tool for STM (Scientific, Technical & Medical). ChatGPT is in a daily race with Alphabet's Gemini for efficacy. All the while, RELX already deploys all these tools within its applications to help power its own AI offering – alongside hundreds of pre-built modules. And with a choice of similar offerings, the value within this space is not accruing to bare models, but to the owners of the accurately referenced and citable datasets upon which they are applied. Consequently, RELX has already seen revenues in its legal division accelerate over the past two years from c.5% to 9% today.

Another important nuance is that startups like Anthropic have so far targeted a different, and far larger, space. Within the legal industry for example, legal workflow (where Claude Cowork Legal applies) is a crowded and fragmented, but much bigger (c.$25bn) market than the reference data (c.$5bn) market that RELX duopolises. Anthropic's Claude therefore feels a bigger threat to other legal AI startups such as OpenAI's already launched Harvey legal tool. Neither Claude nor Harvey have shown any sign of accumulating their own data – why would they when they have a bigger, easier opportunity elsewhere – and indeed both have partnered with RELX and LSEG for exactly that reason. These areas are to date poorly served by sophisticated legal tools and data, arguably creating white space for RELX to leverage its existing brands.

James Bullock, 6th February 2026

Source: Lindsell Train, Morningstar & Bloomberg. All data as of 31st January 2026.

Note: All stock returns are in local currency unless otherwise specified.

Important information

This bulletin is solely for the use of professional investors and should not be relied upon by any other person. It is not intended for use by retail clients. Nothing in the document should be construed as advice and it is therefore not a recommendation to buy or sell shares.

Lindsell Train Global Equity Fund Class C (ISIN:IE00BK4Z4V95) is a sub-fund of Lindsell Train Global Funds plc, an umbrella fund with segregated liability between sub-funds. This means that the holdings of the fund are maintained separately under Irish law from the holdings of other sub-funds of Lindsell Train Global Funds plc. The Prospectus and the annual and semi-annual reports are prepared in the name of Lindsell Train Global Funds plc.

This Fund is authorised in Ireland and regulated by the Central Bank of Ireland.

Collective Investment Schemes (CIS) are generally medium to long-term investments.The value may go down as well as up and past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. CIS's are traded at ruling prices and can engage in borrowing and scrip lending.The CIS may borrow up to 10% of the market value of the portfolio to bridge insufficient liquidity.A schedule of fees and charges and maximum commissions is available on request from the Investment Manager.There is no guarantee in respect of capital or returns in a portfolio. A CIS may be closed to new investors in order for it to be managed more efficiently in accordance with its mandate.CIS prices are calculated on a net asset basis, which is the total value of all the assets in the portfolio including any income accruals and less any permissible deductions (brokerage, STT, VAT, auditor's fees, bank charges, trustee and custodian fees and the annual Management fee) from the portfolio divided by the number of participatory interests (shares) in issue.Forward pricing is used. The Fund's Total Expense Ratio (TER) reflects the percentage of the average Net Asset Value* (NAV) of the portfolio that was incurred as charges, levies and fees related to the management of the portfolio. A higher TER does not necessarily imply a poor return, nor does a low TER imply a good return. The current TER cannot be regarded as an indication of future TER's. During the phase in period TER's do not include information gathered over a full year.It excludes transaction costs.

The investor acknowledges the inherent risk associated with the selected investments and that there are no guarantees. Please note that all documents, notifications of deposit, investment, redemption and switch applications must be received by the fund administrator, Waystone by or before 12 noon each Ireland & UK Business Day, to be transacted at the net asset value price for that day. Where all required documentation is not received before the stated cut off time, Waystone shall not be obliged to transact at that day's net asset value price.The Fund is priced at 12 noon each Ireland & UK Business Day Prices are published daily and are available on the Lindsell Train website.

Performance has been calculated using net NAV to NAV numbers with income reinvested. The performance for each period shown reflects the return for investors who have been fully invested for that period. Individual investor performance may differ as a result of the actual investment date, the date of reinvestments and dividend withholding tax. Full performance calculations are available from the investment manager on request.

Lindsell Train Global Equity Fund is authorised by the FSCA under section 65 of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 2002.

For any additional information such as fund prices, prospectus, application forms, please go to www.lindselltrain.com.

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Glossary

Annualised return: The weighted average compound growth rate over the period measured.
Cumulative return: The aggregate performance of the fund over the entire time period.
Highest & Lowest return: The highest and lowest returns for any 12 months over the period since inception have been shown.
NAV: The net asset value represents the assets of a fund less its liabilities.

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